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MARBURY AND THE RETREAT FROM

JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
Larry D. Kramer*

I. INTRODUCTION: EVER SINCE MARBURY

For many long years, conventional wisdom had it that Marbury v. Madison invented the modern practice of judicial review,
by which we mean a practice of regularly submitting constitutional disputes to courts for final resolution in the context of ordinary litigation. Most lawyers and judges (and a surprising
number of academics) apparently still hold this view-the Supreme Court itself being among the most persistent offenders in
this regard. "No doubt the political branches have a role in interpreting and applying the Constitution," Chief Justice
Rehnquist recently wrote, "but ever since Marbury this Court
has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text. " 1
Rarely cited before the second half of the twentieth century,
Marbury has become the keystone to the present Court's jurisprudence, the main source of its claim to supremacy and sometimes exclusivity in the domain of constitutional law and interpretation.
Those who follow historical scholarship have a different
view of the case: one in which Marbury confirmed an existing
practice that might be called "judicial review" but that bears little resemblance to what passes for review today and that certainly reco9nized nothing like the modern doctrine of judicial
supremacy. Yet the relationship between Marbury and the
* Associate Dean for Research and Academics and Russell D. Niles Professor of
Law, New York University School of Law. The material below is drawn from a forthcoming book, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004), which offers a more comprehensive account of the origins and development of judicial review from its beginnings in colonial society until today.
I. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000).
2. Chief credit for initiating the revisionist understanding of Marbury belongs to
Sylvia Snowiss, who developed the argument in her book JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990). Other scholars had previously argued that the mod205
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modern practice nevertheless remains important. Revisionist
scholars have, for the most part, assumed that an idea like judicial supremacy was not yet available when Marshall wrote, reasoning that it emerged only in subsequent decades. 3 Marbury, in
this conception, reflected an immature state in the development
of judicial power that was fleshed out and refined with experience. Though many of the scholars who make this sort of argument are not particular fans of the judiciary, their work has nevertheless contributed to a new mythology in which judicial
supremacy is treated as the logical and inexorable endpoint of a
beneficent progress. 4
In fact, as I will argue below, the claim that judges had special authority for interpreting the Constitution and that judicial
decisions were meant to be final and binding on everyone was
fully developed by the middle of the 1790s. Politically controversial from the start, this position was decisively rejected by the
American public in the elections of 1800 and 1802. Read in context, Marbury is best understood as a retreat from judicial supremacy-a self-conscious backing away from the claim that
constitutional interpretation is a uniquely legal and judicial responsibility. The current Supreme Court's reliance on Marshall's
opinion for this very claim could hardly be more ironic.
II. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ORIGINS
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The revisionist story of Marbury begins before the Constitution was adopted, before even Independence was declared, for
colonial Americans brought with them from England a concept
of constitutionalism that provided the crucial background conditions in which an idea of judicial review would develop. The
ern practice of judicial review emerged later than Marbury, though none with the sophistication of Snowiss's account. See CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN
JUDICIAL REVIEW (rev. ed. 1994); J.M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LONG ROBE:
THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICA (1989). l published my own version of
this story in The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (2001), which is significantly reworked and elaborated in a forthcoming book,
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, cited in the introductory note.
3. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Enslaved to Judicial Supremacy?, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1197, 1197 (1993) ("[f)or most of our history, most Americans have seen the Supreme Court as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, entitled (this side of an
amendment) to impose its understanding of the Constitution on the states, the other
branches of the federal government, and the people"); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S
LAW 34-35 (1996) ("interpretive authority is already distributed by history" which
"shows that our judges have final interpretive authority").

2003]

RETREAT FROM JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

207

critical feature of this eighteenth-century British constitution
was that it rested on the consent of the governed. In American
eyes, this meant the constitution was superior to any action by
the government, which had no authority unilaterally to alter or
abrogate its terms. The British constitution was law made by the
people to govern their governors. It was interpreted and enforced by the people themselves, speaking through the full array
of eighteenth-century devices available to register the will of the
community: elections, petitions, conventions, juries, mobs, and
the like. There was no notion of judicial review because courts,
like every other agency of government, were the constitution's
targets: the regulated. Final responsibility for interpreting and
enforcing constitutional law necessarily lay outside the government, in the community itself.
This system, which I and others have elsewhere named
"popular constitutionalism," rested on social conditions and
practices whose significance becomes evident only in hindsight.
Chief among these was a distinction between law and politics
that ordinary citizens as well as community leaders could recognize and understand and that both groups took seriously. In addition, the world of the eighteenth-century constitution was one
in which intense constitutional conflict was rare-a product,
among other things, of the narrowness of fundamental law and
the limited role of government. What conflicts arose were kept
in check by a "well born" elite to which ordinary citizens deferred. Deference was crucial not only in keeping popular action
under control, but also in helping contemporaries distinguish legitimate extralegal opposition from an ordinary riot. Notwithstanding its popular basis, the British constitution was a fundamentally conservative institution, a means for ordinary people
guided by their social betters to preserve customary ways of doing things and to counter abuses by the Crown.
The American Revolution arose out of a series of disagreements over the meaning and proper interpretation of this constitution. It was, in essence, a rebellion fought to preserve an existing understanding of constitutionalism, an understanding
Americans did not suddenly decide to abandon or repudiate
upon achieving independence. Written constitutions took their
place within and alongside those portions of the existing constitution that had not necessarily been abrogated by the break with
Great Britain, and substantive doctrines and arguments from before the Revolution continued to apply. More important for present purposes, everyone took for granted that responsibility for
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constitutional interpretation and enforcement remained with the
community.
All that notwithstanding, the Revolution inevitably produced changes that exerted pressure on existing practices of constitutional law, and from these emerged a first approximation of
judicial review. Suddenly America's legislatures found themselves doing far more than before: a product not only of Britain's
withdrawal, but also of war and of new demands for government
action in a variety of domains. Together with the greater explicitness of written constitutions, this created many more opportunities for constitutional conflict than had formerly existed. Plus,
the process of upholding the British constitution against the
claims of Parliamentary sovereignty had deepened Americans'
commitment to a constitution's basis in popular sovereignty-a
reaction enhanced in tum by the experience of drafting new constitutions in the states. Infused with Revolutionary fervor, the
American understanding of constitutionalism became less conservative and more reformist in nature, again increasing the likelihood of constitutional conflict.
The men who crafted America's new constitutions offered a
variety of devices to handle the increased volume of constitutional law and disagreement. These included everything from
provisions for formal amendment to councils of censors and
councils of revision to periodic conventions of the people, executive vetoes, and more. A few people suggested a role for courts.
Reasoning from within the still unchallenged premises of popular constitutionalism, they argued that because a constitution
embodied the voice of the people, its obligations and limitations
were binding on every branch of the government. A legislature
that enacted a law inconsistent with constitutional commands
was acting unlawfully; it might be the people's responsibility to
mete out punishment, but a court that enforced this law was
making itself an accomplice to the same illegal act. By instead
refusing to enforce unconstitutional laws, judges could serve not
only as the people's faithful agent but also as their proxy, supplying a peaceful remedy that might make popular action from the
community unnecessary.
The argument, in other words, was that judges no less than
anyone else should resist unconstitutional laws. This obligation
did not arise from any special competence that judges possessed
as judges, and it certainly was not based on the notion that a
constitution was just so much law subject to judicial control. It
was, rather, simply another instance of the right and responsibil-
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ity of every citizen to oppose unconstitutional government action.
This embryonic version of judicial review played only a
small role in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and virtually
none in the subsequent debate over ratification. The idea was
novel and not widely publicized, and it had proved controversial
and unreliable in the few cases in which it had been raised. The
Framers did assign judges a role policing unconstitutional state
laws-something acceptable to opponents of a strong federal
government precisely because a judicial check was thought to be
weak and tenuous- but they otherwise paid scant attention to
judicial review. When it came to policing federal action, the
Founders focused on more established, better known ways of
preserving constitutional limits, such as a council of revision
(which they rejected) and an array of now-familiar political
checks including bicameralism, federalism, and an executive
veto.
None of this is surprising once we recognize that the movement to adopt a new Federal Constitution was not a rejection of
popular constitutionalism. On the contrary, the Framers and
Founders took popular constitutionalism for granted and were
no more likely to question it than we today would be to question
our own commitment to a very different notion of democracy.
Even this formulation is misleading if it implies that something
was up for grabs, for the principles of popular constitutionalism
were so widely shared among the Revolutionary generation as to
be largely invisible. They were background assumptions, a
shared baseline from which reformers developed their ideas for
reform.
The new Constitution was thus an effort made from within a
system of popular constitutionalism to respond to lessons
learned since the Revolution. In securing a stable central government, Federalist leaders hoped also to counter some of this
system's excesses and to restore its balance, at least at the federallevel.5 Federalists perceived this balance as having been upset in the states by the erosion of deference and the rise of a new
class of less worthy leaders. 6 It could be restored, Federalists
hoped, by two features of the new government. First, the sheer

See Larry Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611,674-75 (1999).
See Gordon S. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION 69 (Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein & Edward
C. Carter, III, eds. 1987).
5.
6.
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size of federal electoral districts would help to ensure that only
men of proper character and virtue were elected, thus removing
a major source of friction and reducing the frequency with which
questionable laws were enacted. 7 Second, separation of powers
within the government would make it possible to settle whatever
constitutional disputes might still arise by accommodation
among the branches, making direct resort to the people unnecessary except on rare occasions. 8
This last point is important and should be emphasized. No
one in 1789 questioned that, as Madison said in Federalist 49,
"the people themselves ... as the grantors of the [Constitution's]
commission, can alone declare its true meaning and enforce its
observance." 9 What Federalist leaders sought were ways to
minimize the frequency with which this grantor would need to be
called upon-much as we today try to minimize the frequency of
litigation by creating opportunities for parties to settle their disputes out of court. But everyone knew where legitimate authority lay if a dispute could not be settled this way: it remained, as
always, with "the people themselves."
III. ACCEPTING JUDICIAL REVIEW
The 1790s were difficult years for the young Republic. The
Federalists who spearheaded the drive for a new Constitution
had not misdiagnosed the problem, but they had mistaken the
cure. Deference was indeed eroding as common people demanded to control what their government did, but this was not
something that could be stopped by making the government
more distant and elite. Indeed, it was not something that could
be stopped at all. Terrible strains emerged as Americans divided
over contentious issues of finance and foreign policy, and political leaders on different sides of the issues found themselves
forced to reach out to the community for support. 1°Former Fed7. /d.; JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 214-27 (1996); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN
FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 46-66 (1990). I have argued elsewhere that this was the
only aspect of Madison's famous theory of the extended republic that his fellow Framers
and Founders seem to have comprehended. See Kramer, supra note 5, passim & esp. 658.
8. The classic cite here is Madison's line of essays in THE FEDERALIST Nos. 49-51,
though this general point about separation of powers was ubiquitous in the debates surrounding the new Constitution.
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 339 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
10. See Michael Wallace, Changing Concepts of Party in the United States: New
York, 1815-1828,74 AM. HIST. REV. 453,455 & n.5 (1968) (citing authorities).
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eralists and Anti-Federalists reshuffled their alliances as the first
political parties formed.
Yet disagreements about Hamilton's bank or the French
Revolution were themselves byproducts of a more fundamental
disagreement about the proper role of ordinary citizens in dayto-day governance. Under the leadership of Jefferson and Madison, Republicans championed an expansive ideal of popular authority, insisting on the people's right to control their representatives at all times and on all issues. Hamilton's Federalists, in
contrast, became progressively more conservative and antipopulist, defending a philosophy that acknowledged the political
power of ordinary citizens on election days but called upon them
between elections to defer passively and unquestioningly to
"constituted authorities. " 11 This was, in a sense, a logical extension of the Federalist ideology of the 1780s, but the antidemocratic strands in Federalist thinking became much more
pronounced in the 1790s-a product not only of unexpectedly
fierce political opposition at home but also of fear from watching
events unfold in France.
Judicial review was a sideshow in this larger struggle. Indeed, the main development of the 1790s respecting judicial authority over the Constitution consisted of widespread acceptance
of the limited argument for review developed in the 1780s.
Hence, rather than claim authority on the ground that constitutional interpretation is a uniquely judicial task, courts emphasized that unconstitutional laws were void and insisted that
courts were no less obligated than the other branches to attend
to this fact. As expressed by the Virginia court in the well-known
case of Kamper v. Hawkins, the constitution applied to the judiciary "as well as" to the other branches, and judges could not
permit themselves to be made "fit agents" in abetting legislative
illegality but should instead uphold constitutional values "on behalf of the people"- though only if the legislative violation was
"plain and clear. " 12
II. James P. Martin, When Repression is Democratic and Constitutional: The Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 117, 13076 (1999).
12. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cases) 20, 39, 61,65-66, 78-79 (1793) (opinions of St. George Tucker, Spencer Roane, John Tyler). Kamper was the most well
known and influential decision on judicial review prior to Marbury-partly because it
came from the respected Virginia court, and partly because it was published in pamphlet
form and was thus more accessible than other opinions in an age before official reports
were common. See CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN OOCfRINE OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 104 (1914); Margaret V. Nelson, The Cases of the Judges: Fact or Fiction?,
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A. DEPARTMENTALISM
The emergence of judicial review, even in this limited and
restrained form, still needed to be fit into a theory of the Constitution. This was accomplished by a "departmental" approach to
separation of powers, which recognized that all three branches
might have a say, though always subject to popular oversight expressed primarily but not exclusively in elections. Madison himself was among the earliest and strongest proponents of this approach. During the 1789 debate over the President's removal
power, Madison conceded the basic argument for judicial review.
"I acknowledge, in the ordinary course of government, that the
exposition of the laws and constitution devolves upon the judicial," he said. It did not follow, however, that judicial decisions
should therefore acquire any special stature or status:
But, I beg to know, upon what principle it can be contended
that any one department draws from the constitution greater
powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers
of the several departments. The constitution is the charter of
the people to the government; it specifies certain great powers
as absolutely granted, and marks out the departments to exercise them. If the constitutional boundary of either be brought
into question, I do not see that any one of these independent
departments has more right than another to declare their sen.
. 13
tlments
on t h at pomt.

Thomas Jefferson, who embraced this theory throughout his political life, 14 expressed the idea succinctly: "[E]ach of the three
31 VA. L. REV. 243, 251 (1945).
13. Speech by James Madison to the House of Representatives on the Removal
Power of the President (June 17, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 232, 238
(Robert A. Rutledge et al. eds, 1979). See also James Madison, "Helvidius" Number 2
(August 31, 1793), in 15 PAPERS OF MADISON, supra, at 80, 83 ("It may happen also that
different independent departments, the legislative and executive, for example, may in the
exercise of their functions, interpret the constitution differently, and thence lay claim
each to the same power. This difference of opinion is an inconvenience not entirely to be
avoided. It results from what may be called, if it be thought fit, a concurrent right to expound the constitution.").
14. See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 257-94 (1994). As Mayer observes, Jefferson's emphasis shifted over timefrom an early confidence in the reliability of courts to a late-life belief that federal judges
were an irresponsible "corps of sappers and miners" working to undermine the Constitution's careful balancing act. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25,
1820), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 169-70 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
1898). But these were changes in tone that occurred within the same departmentalist
framework, a framework Jefferson restated on numerous occasions over the course of
three decades. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 4
MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE AND MISCELLANIES FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
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departments has equally the right to decide for itself what is its
duty under the constitution, without regard to what the others
15
may have decided for themselves under a similar question."
Kentucky Senator John Breckinridge described how this
departmental theory would work in practice. "Although ... the
courts may take upon them to give decisions which impeach the
constitutionality of a law, and thereby, for a time, obstruct its
operations," he explained:
[Y]et I contend that such a law is not the less obligatory because the organ through which it is to be executed has refused
its aid. A pertinacious adherence of both departments to their
opinions, would soon bring the question to issue, in whom the
sovereign power of legislation resided, and whose construc16
tion of the law-making power should prevail.

By "bring the question to issue," Breckinridge meant that "pertinacious adherence" by different branches to conflicting views
would force the public to decide. Ideally, this would seldom be
necessary and disputes would be settled (as most disputes were)
by the branches themselves, without a need for popular intervention. But if a dispute could not be settled and needed authoritative resolution, politics was the proper forum and the people
were the proper agent.
B. MARBURY V. MADISON

John Marshall's opinion in Marbury was not merely consistent with this departmental approach, but explicit in embracing
its underlying theory of judicial review. Like other writers of the
period, Marshall began with the principle that the Constitution is
"a superior, paramount law," and that, therefore, "an act of the
JEFFERSON 26, 27 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June 2, 1807), in id. at 75, 75; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W.H.
Torrance (June 11, 1815), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 516,
517-18; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 10 id. at 140,
141-42; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Jarvis Short (Sept. 28, 1820), in id. at
160, 160-61.
15. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 14, at 140, 142. Jefferson recognized that certain
questions were, by their very nature, not subject to come before all the branches and
that, with respect to such questions, one branch or another might be able to act "ultimately and without appeal" (except to the people). See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
William Torrance (June 11, 1815), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 14, at
517~18. The departmental theory applied to all those questions subject to concurrent junsdlctwn, and as to these Jefferson felt no compunction leaving things that way and
made no effort to assign every question to one authority for final resolution.
16. Speech by John Breckinridge, in 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 179-80 (1802).
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legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void." 17 He then
asked, again like other writers, "does [such a law], notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect?"18 Though this would seem, "at first view, an absurdity too
gross to be insisted on," 19 Marshall proposed nevertheless to say
more and explain why. Then, the famous line: "It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is." 20
Read in context, this sentence did not say what, to modern
eyes, it seems to say when read in isolation. That is, it did not say
"it is the job of courts, alone, to say what the Constitution
means." Nor did it say, "it is the job of courts, more so than others, to say what the Constitution means." What it said was
"courts, too, can say what the Constitution means." Marshall
thus immediately followed his celebrated sentence with the same
explanation as that previously offered by Republican judges St.
George Tucker and Spencer Roane in Kamper v. Hawkins. A
constitution, Tucker had observed a decade earlier is a rule "to
all the departments of the government." The legislature and executive were obliged to consider it in discharging their responsibilities for making and executing laws. But how, Tucker asked,
could judges discharge their duty, which was to expound the law,
"if that which is the supreme law of the land be withheld from
their view?" 21 Roane had agreed with Tucker that it was illogical
to say that judges must blind themselves to constitutional considerations. "In expounding laws," he observed,
the judiciary considers every law which relates to the subject:
would you have them to shut their eyes against that law which
is of the highest authority of any, or against a part of that law,
which either by its words or by its spirit, denies to any but the
22
people the power to change it?

Now listen to Marshall, who virtually plagiarized their opinions in Marbury:
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule .... Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in

17.
18.
19.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (quotes at p. 177).
/d.
!d.

20.

/d.

21.

Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cases) at 78-79.

22.

/d. at 38-39.
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court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of
maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitu23
tion, and see only the law.

Marshall added a textual argument. Federal judicial power
extends to cases "arising under" the Constitution. 24 "Could it
be," he asked incredulously, "[t]hat a case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument
under which it arises?" 25 To anyone still unpersuaded of the "extravagan[ce ]" of such a supposition, Marshall offered a list of
blatantly unconstitutional laws that would have to be enforced
by courts if judges were directed to ignore questions of constitutionality.26 "From these, and many other selections which might
be made," he concluded, "it is apparent, that the framers of the
constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature. " 27 Marshall reiterated this insistence that courts were not less responsible for the
Constitution than the other branches and had concurrent constitutional authority in his closing: a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and "courts, as well as other departments, are bound
by that instrument. "28
There may be respects in which Marshall's reasoning in
Marbury was unique, 29 but they are small and unimportant and
what truly stands out in the opinion is its lack of originality. Marshall himself acknowledged as much, for he was being neither
ironic nor misleading when he introduced the question of judicial review by observing that it was "not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest" and could be decided by "certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established. "30
Marbury broke no new ground in the theory of judicial review. It
simply reiterated the modest idea developed in the 1780s and established in the 1790s: the judiciary was no less obligated than
the other branches of government to take the Constitution into
account, no less obligated to do its best to understand and follow
the people's commands-always subject, however, like these

23.
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-178.
U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179.
/d.
/d. at 179-80 (emphasis added).
/d. at 180 (emphasis added).
See SNOWISS, supra note 2, at 125, 139.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
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other branches, to oversight from the body with ultimate interpretive authority, "the people themselves."
III. REJECTING JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
A puzzle remains. If not in Marbury, when did Americans
begin to argue that constitutional disputes should ordinarily be
resolved in litigation and that judicial decisions should be
deemed to settle these disputes once and for all? According to
some scholars, such ideas were not conceived until decades after
Marbury, becoming respectable only in the 1820s or 1830s. 31
Others say the modern doctrine emerged later still, only after
Reconstruction, in the 1870s and 1880s. 32 In fact, the argument
for judicial supremacy was fully developed by the mid-1790s, and
understanding how and why it emerged-as well as how and why
it was rejected-sheds additional light on Marbury and lends further support to the revisionist reading of the case.
A. FEDERALISM IN THE 1790s
We like our Founding Fathers to be steady and heroic. We
like to picture them having fully developed their theory of government by the time they wrote the Constitution, and we like to
read what they said in ways that still seem attractive today. We
also like to believe that our heroes did not change their minds
simply because the Constitution was ratified and had to be put
into effect.
Of course, none of these things is true. The Founding Fathers were still formulating their ideas about government when
the opportunity to write a new Constitution presented itself.
And not only were their partly-formed ideas distinctly unlike our
ideas today, but the experience of actually governing continued
to shape the Founders' thinking in ways that made these ideas
unlike what they had been just a few years earlier. In the case of
the Federalists, or those former Anti-Federalists who became
Federalists, this meant a shift from moderate anxiety about the
risks of republican politics to an extreme conservatism that
swung sharply back toward the monarchical social order the
Revolution had purported to abandon.
31. See SNOWISS, supra note 2; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND
CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 594 (1988)
32. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 18701960, at 19 (1992); WOLFE, supra note 2, at 4; ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V.
MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW X (1989).
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Federalism was from the first a rejection of the unruly style
of popular politics that Revolutionary leaders had practiced
against England in the 1760s. It was an effort to preserve the
tradition of deference that, in the eyes of the elite, was essential
33
to keep republican politics from spinning out of control.
Somewhat muted in the 1780s, this mild conservatism became
increasingly pronounced as time passed. Federalists never
wanted to anoint a King or create a hereditary aristrocracy, as
Republicans sometimes charged. But the "democracy" they believed in was, as Gordon Wood has put it, "a patrician-led classical democracy in which 'virtue exemplified in government will
diffuse its salutary influence through[ out] the society. '" 34 Federalists witnessed the effects of the Revolution, observed their
leadership being challenged by farmers, mechanics, and shopkeepers, and did not like what they saw.
In the Federalist world view, particularly as it emerged after
ratification, ordinary citizens had no business tryin9 to influence
the direction of government outside of election day. 5 Individuals
might offer a "decent manly statement of opinion," 36 but free
speech did not go so far as to include the right to publish something whose "professed design is the superintendence of [the]
government" or whose "evident tendency, by obtaining an influence, is to lessen the power of officers of government, and to
lead, or rather to drive, the legislature, where ever they
please. "37 Such speech must be stopped, Samuel Kendal warned,
lest it "prove destructive to 'liberty with order."' 38 Oliver Wolcott went so far as to say it was "unlawful" for any group or organization to assemble "for the avowed purpose of a general influence and control upon the measures of government. "39
Federalists recognized that they needed permission to rule,
permission that had to be sought in free republican elections.
But once this permission had been granted, ordinary citizens
33. See DAVID HACKETI FISCHER, THE REVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
CONSERVATISM 2-17 (1965); David Waldstrcicher, Federalism, the Styles of Politics, and
the Politics of Style, in FEDERALISTS RECONSIDERED 99, 109-111 (Doron Ben Atar &
Barbara B. Oberg eds. 1998); Wood, supra note 6, at 69.
34. /d. at 83; Martin, supra note 11, at 130-76; Michael Les Benedict, The Jeffersonian Republicans and Civil Liberty, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF LIBERTY 23 (1988).
35. Martin, supra note 11, at 160-66.
36. SAMUEL KENDAL, A SERMON DELIVERED ON THE DAY OF NATIONAL
THANKSGIVING 30 (Samuel Hall 1795).
37. To the Vigil, GAZETIE OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (Dec. 6, 1794).
38. KENDAL, supra note 36, at 30.
39. Quoted in 1 MEMOIRS OF THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND JOHN
ADAMS 178, 179 (George Gibbs ed., 1846) (Oliver Wolcott, March 26, 1795).
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were supposed to lose their political agency. "[T]he sovereignty
of the people is delegated to those whom they have freely appointed to administer [the] constitution, and by them alone can
be rightly exercised, save at the stated period of election, when
the sovereignty is again at the disposal of the whole people." 40
Between elections, the people needed only to listen and to obey.
Unity, "respectability," order, and, above all, reverence for
"constituted authorities" were the hallmarks Federalists looked
for in a well-functioning political system. 41
Particularly after 1793, as news spread of the Terror in
France, this anxiety to contain popular politics veered toward
hysteria. Federalists became obsessed with the need to make
citizens show "respect" and "deference" and "obedience" to
constituted authorities. Nathaniel Emmons preached a sermon
in 1799 whose talk about what "subjects" owe their "rulers"
makes Republican suspicions about the Federalists' monarchical
aims appear almost reasonable:
The duty of submission naturally results from the relations,
which subjects bear to their rulers. There would be no propriety in calling the body of the people subjects, unless they were
under obligation to obey those in the administration of government. Every people, either directly or indirectly promise
submission to their rulers. Those, who choose their civil magistrates, do voluntarily pledge their obedience, whether they
take the oath of allegiance or not. By putting power into the
hands of their rulers, they put it out of their own; by choosing
and authorizing them to govern, they practically declare, that
they are willing to be governed; and by declaring their willingness to be governed, they equally declare their intention
42
and readiness to obey.

B. RETHINKING THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY

With such a philosophy, in a world where ordinary citizens
were increasingly vehement (and successful) in demanding to
control their government, is it any wonder that Federalists began
casting about for new ways to blunt popular participation?

40. Order, COLUMBIAN CENTINEL 1 (Sept. 3, 1794).
41. Waldstreicher, supra note 33, at 101, 109; Martin, supra note 11, at 143-52;
Benedict, supra note 34, at 26-29.
42. Nathaniel Emmons, A Discourse Delivered on the National Fast (1799), in 2
AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1023, 1027 (Charles S.
Hyneman & DonaldS. Lutz eds., 1983).
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Within just a few years, they found themselves championing a
novel and radically different role for courts.
Though many examples could be cited to illustrate the
change in Federalist thinking, James Kent's 1794 introductory
law lectures are typical. Unlike earlier writers on judicial review,
Kent (at the time a 31-year old novice law professor) placed
great emphasis on the need for "the firmness and moderation of
the Judicial department" to protect "the equal rights of a minor
faction" from "the passions of a fierce and vindictive majority." 43
This fear of majority tyranny had always been a critical element
of the Federalists' philosophy, but it had not previously been
emphasized in connection with judicial review. Some earlier
writers had referred in passing to problems of faction while discussing the courts' role in enforcing the Constitution, but their
references were brief because earlier backers of judicial review
were thinking mostly about legislative mistakes or efforts by le~
islators to aggrandize their own power at the people's expense. 4
That this should have been so is unsurprising given judicial review's original basis in eighteenth-century forms of popular constitutionalism and resistance.
Kent, in contrast, made majority tyranny the heart of his argument for judicial review; and unlike prior writers, he offered it
as the best and most important reason to prefer judges to legislators when it came to interpreting the Constitution. More even
than this, Kent turned the fear of faction into an argument also
against relying on "the force of public opinion":
[S]ad experience has sufficiently taught mankind, that opinion
is not an infallible standard of safety. When powerful rivalries
prevail in the Community, and Parties become highly disciplined and hostile, every measure of the major part of the
Legislature is sure to receive the sanction of that Party among
their Constituents to which they belong. Every Step of the
minor Party, it is equally certain will be approved by their
immediate adherents, as well as indiscriminately misrepresented or condemned by the prevailing voice. 45

This was different from, and more radical than, what courts
and judges had been saying. Judicial review in Kent's hands was
43. James Kent, An Introductory Lecture to a Court of Law Lectures, in id at 941.
44. The only previous writer to make anything of the point was Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78, though even he offered it as a secondary justification, after protectmg the people from "legislative encroachments." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 9,
at 527-28.
45. Kent, supra note 43, at 942.
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not a substitute for popular resistance that would be difficult to
organize, nor was it a peaceful means of rendering such resistance unnecessary. It was a check on the whims and caprice of an
easily led mob.
The polemical drift in Federalist thinking reflected in Kent's
argument-a shift from seeing judicial review mainly as a device
to protect the people from their governors, to viewing it first and
foremost as a means of guarding the Constitution from the people-might have been just a matter of time given the Federalists'
general predilections and prejudices. A need for judicial review
to serve as a check on faction, seen only hazily at first, could
eventually have come into sharper focus no matter what. But political developments in the 1790s intervened to give this line of
reasoning a powerful boost, generating (or perhaps merely accelerating) a heightened appreciation among Federalists of the
potential usefulness of courts in securing constitutional limits
from the threat posed by a partisan majority. As the Federalists'
naive expectation peaceably to govern a quiescent population
collapsed amidst growing partisan acrimony, an enhanced role
for courts protecting the Constitution from faction must have
seemed obvious, almost natural-as if the federal judiciary had
been deliberately constructed with precisely this purpose in
mind. Courts, Kent concluded, because they are "organized with
peculiar advantages to exempt them from the baneful influence
of Faction," were "the most proper power in the Government
to ... maintain the Authority of the Constitution." 46
This was so, Kent continued, for a second reason as well:
separation of powers. The three departments of government, he
observed, are kept "as far as possible separate and distinct" in
order to prevent the introduction of "Tyranny into the Administration." It followed that interpretive authority should be vested
exclusively in courts of law:
[T]he interpretation or construction of the Constitution is as
much a JUDICIAL act, and requires the exercise of the same
LEGAL DISCRETION, as the interpretation or construction
of a Law. The Courts are indeed bound to regard the Constitution [as] what it truly is, a Law of the highest nature, to
47
which every inferior derivative regulation must conform.

46.
47.

Id. at 942.
/d. at 942-43.
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Here was another newfound claim: a constitution is just so
much ordinary law. And because constitutional interpretation is
an ordinary judicial and legal act, it is not an act to be performed
by legislative or executive officials. Judges, Kent repeated, are
"the proper and intended Guardians of our limited Constitutions. "48
By the late 1790s, ideas such as these were no longer being
expressed only by pamphleteers and politicians, some Federalist
judges had begun voicing the new theory from the bench. Presiding over the seditious libel prosecution of Matthew Lyon, Justice
William Paterson instructed the jury that it could not pass on the
constitutionality of the Sedition Act. Jurors must treat the law as
valid, Paterson insisted, unless and until it was "declared null
and void by a tribunal competent for the purpose. " 49 Samuel
Chase preached an even stronger line in charging a Pennsylvania
Grand Jury. "The Judicial Power," he said, "are the only proper
and competent authority to decide whether any Law made by
Congress; or any of the State Legislatures is contrary to or in
Violation of the federal Constitution. " 5° Chase, too, was as good
as his word when presiding at trial-lecturing John Fries that
questions of constitutionality were the sole province of the judiciary as he sentenced him to death for leading a mob protest
against federal taxes, 51 and refusing to permit Thomas Callendar's defense attorney to argue to the jury the unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act. 52
Republicans were horrified. They were willing to acknowledge that courts should take notice of the Constitution, but only
within the terms of their departmental theory. Judicial interpretations, on this view, had no more intrinsic weight than those of
Congress or the executive, and all were subordinate to the "will
of the community," which retained final interpretive authority.
To say this authority was vested in life-tenured judges was to

48. !d. at 944.
49. FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE
ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AI'D ADAMS 336 (1849).
50. Samuel Chase's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District
of Pennsylvania (April 12, 1800), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1800, at 408,412 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1990) [hereinafter cited as DHSCJ.
51. See WHARTON, supra note 49, at 637-38; STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 696-99 (1993).
52. See 3 DHSC, supra note 50, at 405; JAMES HAW, STORMY PATRIOT: THE LIFE
OF SAMUEL CHASE 203-06 (1980).
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contradict and repudiate the republican nature of American
government.
This split in views was nowhere more apparent than in the
controversy over the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Republicancontrolled legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky sought to rouse
opposition to the acts by promulgating resolutions calling upon
the states jointly to urge federal lawmakers to repeal the offending laws. Federalist-dominated legislatures in ten of the fourteen
other states opposed their efforts, with several insisting that
"state legislatures are not the proper tribunals to determine the
constitutionality of the laws of the general government" because
"the duty of such decision is properly and exclusively confided to
the judicial department." 53 James Madison offered the Republican reply to these claims of judicial supremacy in his famous Report of 1800 for the legislature of Virginia, which denied "that
the judicial authority is to be regarded as the sole expositor of
the constitution" and reasserted the theory of departmentalism
and the principle of popular constitutionalism. 54 "The authority
of constitutions over governments, and of the sovereignty of the
people over constitutions," Madison urged, "are truths which are
at all times necessary to be kept in mind."
With lines thus clearly drawn between a Republican Constitution and a Federalist one, the two parties squared off in the
election of 1800. This pivotal contest exhibited something rarely
seen in national elections in the United States: a choice between
well-defined alternatives, both clear and clearly understood.
Like the question of a national bank in 1832 or the New Deal in
1936, Republicans and Federalists in 1800 offered the public
sharply drawn, alternative visions of the Constitution. And the
Federalists were decisively, indeed, overwhelmingly, repudiated.55 The American public, or at least that portion of it permitted to vote, opted for Republican principles and the Republican
understanding of constitutionalism. So complete was the rout
53. Answers of the Several State Legislatures, in 4 JONATHON ELLIOT, THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS AND THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 538, 539 (1888 ed.) (New Hampshire); see also id. at 533
(Rhode Island), 539 (Vermont).
54. Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (Jan. 7, 1800), in JAMES MADISON:
WRITINGS 608,613 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
55. Because of peculiarities in the way electors were chosen, the best measure of
how sweeping a victory Jefferson's party had won is found in elections to the House of
Representatives. Going into the election, Federalists held 63 seats to the Republicans' 43.
The vote in 1800 more than reversed these numbers, leaving the Republicans with a 6541 edge and a clear mandate to change the government's direction. See MANNING J.
DAUER, THE ADAMS FEDERALISTS 273,274 tbls. 21 & 22 (1953).
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that Jefferson's party would dominate American politics for the
next generation.
C. THE REPEAL DEBATE AND THE DEATH OF FEDERALISM
Federalists made one last stab at selling their vision of the
judicial power to the American people, during the fight over repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801. This closely watched contest
reprised and elaborated the arguments made in the late 1790s.
Both sides detailed their views in greater depth than before, exposing how far apart their respective positions had become. It
was, as it turned out, the last gasp of what we might call the first
Federalism movement, at least as an intellectual force. 56
Treating repeal as a thinly disguised effort to destroy judicial independence, Federalist speakers urged the necessity of an
effective judicial check on Congress and on politics generally.
Predictably, their first concern was for preserving order. Judicial
supremacy was imperative, they said, because the alternative was
violence and bloodshed. "What security is there to an individual,
if the Legislature of the Union or any particular State, should
pass [an unconstitutional] law?" asked Uriah Tracy in the Senate. "None in the world but by an appeal to the Judiciary of the
United States, where he will obtain a decision that the law itself
is unconstitutional and void, or by a resort to revolutionary principles, and exciting a civil war." 57 Roger Griswold made the
same argument while avoiding histrionics. Everyone on both
sides conceded that some kind of check on Congress was
needed, he observed, and "[i]f this power of checking the unconstitutional acts of the Legislature is necessary, where can it reside with so much propriety as in your courts?" 58

56. On the disillusionment of these first generation Federalists after 1800, see
LINDA K. KERBER, FEDERALISTS IN DISSENT: IMAGERY AND IDEOLOGY IN
JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1970). David Hackett Fisher and, more recently, Marshall
Foletta have, in different ways, described the efforts of next generation Federalists to
reinvent themselves-Fisher in politics, where they had little success, and Foletta in intellectual pursuits, where their impact was somewhat greater. FISCHER, supra note 33;
MARSHALL FOLETTA, COMING TO TERMS WITH DEMOCRACY: FEDERALIST
INTELLECTUALS AND THE SHAPII\G OF AN AMERICAN CULTURE (2001). Daniel Hulsebasch depicts the later Federalists' quite substantial success in changing the legal profession and practice of law. See DANIEL 1. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW
YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATIOI" OF FEDERALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD chs. 7-8
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with author).
57. Speech by Uriah Tracy, 11 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 56.
58. Speech by Roger Griswold, in id. at 783.
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With the people themselves, answered Republicans-a reply that seemed to infuriate Federalists. "Not so, sir, is the case
with us," John Rutledge, Jr., snarled:
[W]e do not wish to guard the Constitution by appeals to the
people; we will do nothing calculated to produce insurrection;
we do not want to protect the great charter of our rights by
the bayonet. No, sir, we rely on honest and legitimate means
of defence; we wish to check these gentlemen only with Con59
stitutional checks.

And "Constitutional checks," Rutledge and numerous other
Federalists made clear, meant primarily, and ultimately, the judiciary.
Gouverneur Morris offered the most strongly worded defense of judicial supremacy. A number of Republicans suggested
that judicial review lacked any constitutional basis. "If it is derived from the Constitution," said John Breckinridge, "I ask gentlemen to point out the clause which grants it. I can find no such
grant. "60 Most Federalists responded by citing precedent or by
pointing to the Supremacy Clause or to the clause that grants jurisdiction over cases "arising under" the Constitution. 61 But
Morris was too exasperated by this point to worry about technicalities:
And he asks where judges got their pretended power of deciding on the constitutionality of laws? If it be in the Constitution
(says he) let it be pointed out. I answer, they derived that
power from authority higher than this Constitution. They derive it from the constitution of man, from the nature of things,
from the necessary progress of human affairs. When you have
enacted a law, when process thereon has been issued, and suit
brought, it becomes eventually necessary that the judges decide on the case before them, and declare what the law is.
They must, of course, determine whether that which is produced and relied on, has indeed the binding force of law. The
decision of the Supreme Court is, and, of necessity, must be
final. This, Sir, is the principle, and the source of the right for
which we contend. 62

59. Speech by John Rutledge, Jr., in id. at 743.
60. Speech of John Brcckinridge, in id. at 179.
61. See, e.g., Speech by Calvin Goddard, in id. at 727; Speech by Roger Griswold, in
id. at 783; Speech by Samuel Dana, in id. at 920-26.
62. Speech of Gouverneur Morris, in id. at 180.
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Of course, most Federalists-including Morris in his calmer
moments-defended judicial review without invoking "the constitution of man," by repeating the same argument that had been
made since the 1780s: courts had a duty to "pronounce on the
validity of acts of Congress" because the Constitution is "paramount, and limits as well the power of the Legislature as the
power of the court. "63
What Federalists now added to this familiar argument, reflecting concerns like those that had motivated James Kent, was
an insistence that "the Judiciary decide at last, and their decision
[be] final," 64 together with an emphasis on faction and majority
tyranny by way of justification. "Legislatures will, in violent
times, enact laws manifestly unjust, oppressive, and unconstitutional," explained Calvin Goddard, "and that, too, under the
specious pretext of relieving the burdens of the people. Such
laws, it is the business of the judges, elevated above the influence
of party, to control. "65
For just this reason, Federalists argued, in 1788 the people
of America "had vested in the judges a check ... a check of the
first necessity, to prevent an invasion of the Constitution by unconstitutional laws-a check which might prevent any faction
from intimidating or annihilating the tribunals themselves." 66
John Rutledge, Jr., said much the same, insisting that the federal
judiciary had been specifically and self-consciously "designed" to
control what the legislature and executive might do to the Constitution.67 This was pure revisionism, of course; in fact, very little attention or emphasis had been given to judicial review when
the Constitution was written and ratified. But things looked different now. Speaking for his party, Rutledge waxed poetic in
limning the new Federalist consensus on the centrality of courts
in the scheme of the Constitution:
We say it is the sheet-anchor which will enable us to ride out
the tornado and the tempest, and that if we part from it there
is no safety left; that it is the only thing which can preserve us
from the perilous lee-shore, the rocks and the quicksands,
where all other Republics have perished. The Judiciary is the

63.
see also,
727-28.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Speech of Samuel Dana, in id. at 920; speech of Roger Griswold, in id. at 783;
e.g., speech of Joseph Hemphill, in id. at 542; speech of Calvin Goddard, in id. at
Speech of Joseph Hemphill, in id. at 543.
Speech of Calvin Goddard, in id. at 728.
Speech by Gouverneur Morris, in id. at 38.
Speech by John Rutledge, Jr., in id. at 743.
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ballast of the national ship; throw it overboard and she must
upset. 68

Republicans answered these arguments, of course, laying
out their own, alternative vision of popular constitutionalism and
departmentalism. But the issue was never seriously in doubt. Jefferson's party was firmly in control, and repeal of the Judiciary
Act was actually quite popular. 69 The vote was close in the Senate, reflecting electoral lag due to its staggered terms rather than
real political strength. 70 More indicative of public sentiment was
the vote in the House, where the measure carried by almost 21.71 More indicative still was the public's total indifference to
Federalist efforts to arouse indignation over repeal or to make it
an issue in the 1802 midterm elections. Rather than being discredited, Republicans gained ground everywhere in the country
except for a single district in Delaware. 72
IV. REAPPRAISING MARBURY
Understanding this background helps us to resolve several
questions about Marbury that have long puzzled commentators.
A. THE DECISION TO ADDRESS JUDICIAL REVIEW

It helps us understand, first, why the Court stretched as hard
as it did to address the matter of judicial review. Everyone who
teaches Marbury loves pointing out to students how easily Marshall could have reached the same result in the case-that the
Court lacked original jurisdiction to entertain Marbury's petition-by interpreting the Judiciary Act not to authorize writs of
73
mandamus unless the Court otherwise had jurisdiction. Mar-

68.
69.

/d.

GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNS0:-1, 2 THE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT- FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN
MARSHALL, 1801-1815, at 156-63 (1981).
70. See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN
THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 47-51 (1971).
71. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 982 (repeal approved by a vote of

59-32).
72. See DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM, 1801-1805, at
140-41 (1970).
73. Indeed, this was a stronger legal position than the one Marshall actually took,
for (as countless scholars have argued) Marshall's conclusion that Article III prohibited
Congress from enlarging the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction was anything but obvious. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 67-69 (1985); James O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219, 255-56
(1992); R. KENT NEWMEYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE
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shall plainly decided to force the question of review. But why,
particularly at this highly charged moment, when the Supreme
Court's political position was so precarious?
The answer may be that the very precariousness of the
Court's position is what led Marshall to do something about judicial review. The repeal of the Judiciary Act had been a major
blow to the federal courts, but the Republicans' anger was not
yet sated. In the course of debating repeal, the concept of judicial review had been attacked in words and with a ferocity not
heard since before the Constitution was adopted; a few Republicans had gone so far as to question its existence in any form and
on any terms. 74 Suddenly, a practice that had seemed so uncontroversial throughout the 1790s no longer seemed immune to attack.
Most Republicans were not prepared to reject judicial review outright-not yet, at least. Most, including the President
himself, accepted the more moderate departmental theory and
were willing to live with review on its limited terms. This was the
moment, Marshall apparently decided, to make a statement: before more extreme sentiments against judicial authority spread
and grew into something more threatening. Yet such a statement
would be effective only if the Court could make it in a way that
dampened rather than inflamed further hostility. Marshall's goal
was, in effect, to get judicial review into the record. Not to create
it, for it already existed, but to deflect an incipient movement to
delegitimize it. Dean Alfange captured the likely drift of Marshall's thinking thus:
[I]t was important to invoke the power of judicial review in
order to establish a precedent for its later use and to include
in the Reports of the Supreme Court a statement of the reasoning by which the power could be shown to be absolutely
necessary. Thus, since judicial review could not safely have
been used to invalidate a law that the Republicans cared
about, it was necessary to find a law that the Republicans did
not care about. And what more perfect law could have been

SUPREME COURT 167-70 (2001).
74. See id. at 167; Ellis, supra note 70, at 58; 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 215-16 (1922). For examples of speeches denouncing judicial review, see Speech by Stevens Thomas Mason, 11 ANNALS OF CONG., supra
note 16, at 59; Speech by John Breckinridge, id. at 178-80; Speech by John Randolph, id.
at 661; Speech by Nathaniel Macon, id. at 710,717-20.
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found for this purpose than § 13 of the Judiciary Act of
75
1789?

We cannot judge whether Marshall's gambit was necessary,
because we do not know how judicial review might have fared
without Marbury. Maybe Marshall's fears were overstated.
Maybe judicial review would have continued to evolve as it did
without this push from the Court. Or maybe not. At the very
least, it seems fair to say, by asserting and exercising the power
of judicial review at just this moment, Marshall may have helped
to preserve a practice that could otherwise have been forced
down a dead end road.
B. THE RETREAT FROM JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

At just this moment, but also in just this way. For the language Marshall used to justify judicial review is also quite telling-especially against the background of the public's decisive
rejection of the Federalist argument for judicial supremacy. That
Marshall personally believed in the Court's supremacy seems
clear. 76 Yet in writing Marbury, Marshall conspicuously and selfconsciously shied away from saying anything that could be read
to endorse such an idea. None of the by-then common arguments that had been made by Federalists since the mid-1790s are
found in Marbury. Nowhere does Marshall say, as James Kent
did, that courts were "the most proper power in the Government
to ... maintain the Authority of the Constitution" 77 or that "the
interpretation or construction of the Constitution ... requires
the exercise of the same LEGAL DISCRETION, as the interpretation or construction of a Law." 78 Nowhere does he assert,
like Calvin Goddard, that "it is the business of the judges, elevated above the influence of party, to control" the other
branches of government. 79 Nor does he even hint, as Samuel
Chase had said explicitly in 1800, that courts are "the only
proper and competent authority to decide whether any Law
made by Congress" is constitutional, 80 much less that a decision
75. Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial
Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. Cr. REV. 329,367-68.
76. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,401 (1819); [John Marshall]
A Friend of the Constitution !X, ALEXANDRIA GAZETIE (July 15, 1819), in GERALD
GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 138 (1969).
77. Kent, supra note 43, at 942.
78. !d. at 942-43.
79. Speech of Calvin Goddard, in 11 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 728.
80. Samuel Chase's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District
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of the Supreme Court "is, and, of necessity, must be final," as
Gouverneur Morris asserted during the debate over repeal. 81
Instead of saying anything that might smack of these unpopular Federalist ideas, Marshall carefully and deliberately
used only comfortable and familiar Republican arguments and
Republican language. In most important respects, his opinion
simply parroted arguments made by the Virginia judges in Kamper v. Hawkins, especially in emphasizing that the Court's power
was concurrent with that of the other branches, that "courts, as
well as other departments" could engage in constitutional interpretation. Marshall thus justified judicial review in terms that
Republican moderates not only could accept, but with which
they agreed.
Among these moderates was Thomas Jefferson, who was
greatly vexed by the lecture Marshall gave him in dictum but
who had nothing bad to say about the Court's discussion of judicial review. This was not because, as conventional wisdom has
long held, Marshall cleverly chose to exercise review in the service of scaling back the Court's jurisdiction. Jefferson was not
stupid. He was perfectly capable of anticipating and appreciating
that other uses could be made of judicial review. But he also was
not opposed to it-not in the modest form presented by Marshall in Marbury.
Bottom line: read in context, Marshall's opinion in Marbury
cannot possibly be used as authority for judicial supremacy.
Quite the opposite, it was an abandonment of the idea and an
endorsement of the Jeffersonian theory of departmentalism. The
current Supreme Court could hardly be more wrong when it
cites Marbury as authority to reject that very theory.
V. CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE
FOR POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
Given the American people's overwhelming rejection of judicial supremacy, one might have expected the idea to expire
with the Federalist Party. But it never disappeared entirely. The
very diffuseness and decentralization of popular constitutionalism made it possible for advocates of judicial authority to continue nursing their claims. Driven out of respectable public debate for a time, the idea of judicial supremacy eventually
of Pennsylvania (April12, 1800), in 3 DHSC, supra note 50, at 412.
81. Speech of Gouverneur Morris, in 11 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 180.
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reemerged from hibernation. Popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy then shared space in American political culture, co-existing in an uncertain and sometimes tense relationship. The result was a dialectical tug of war that continues even
today.
How this happened and how it has played out over time is a
long and complicated story, told elsewhere. 82 Here, we need say
only the following: For most of American history, popular constitutionalism probably reflected the dominant public understanding, and it was the clear victor each time matters came to a
head, as they did, for example, in 1832, in 1857, and in 1937.
Whether popular constitutionalism would still prevail todaywhether the American people in 2003 would follow their forbears by insisting on their right to control the Constitution, or
would instead hand control over to what Martin Van Buren once
condemned as "the selfish and contracted rule of a judicial oligarchy"83 -seems an open question. We should, however, at
least recognize that the question is open. Judicial supremacy is
not the logical or inevitable product of experience and progress.
It remains now, as it was in the beginning, but one side in a recurrent and ongoing struggle to determine the proper role of ordinary citizens in a republic.

82. Readers who have made it this far will, hopefully, find themselves intrigued
enough to read THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (forthcoming Oxford, 2004), wh1ch more fully recounts the h1stoncal
course of debates about judicial review and judicial supremacy from the Revolution until
today.
83. MARTIN VAN BUREN, INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN AND COURSE OF POLITICAL
PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 376 (1867).

